The Justice Department has announced coordinated actions against the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea government’s schemes to fund its regime through remote IT work for U.S. companies.
These actions include two indictments, an arrest, searches of 29 known or suspected “laptop farms” across 16 states, and the seizure of 29 financial accounts used to launder illicit funds and 21 fraudulent websites.
According to court documents, the schemes involve North Korean individuals fraudulently obtaining employment with U.S. companies as remote IT workers, using stolen and fake identities. The North Korean actors were assisted by individuals in the United States, China, United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan, and successfully obtained employment with more than 100 U.S. companies.
As alleged in court documents, certain U.S.-based individuals enabled one of the schemes by creating front companies and fraudulent websites to promote the bona fides of the remote IT workers, and hosted laptop farms where the remote North Korean IT workers could remote access into U.S. victim company-provided laptop computers.
Once employed, the North Korean IT workers received regular salary payments, and they gained access to, and in some cases stole, sensitive employer information such as export controlled U.S. military technology and virtual currency. In another scheme, North Korean IT workers used false or fraudulently obtained identities to gain employment with an Atlanta, Georgia-based blockchain research and development company and stole virtual currency worth approximately over $900,000.
On Monday, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts and the National Security Division announced the arrest of U.S. national Zhenxing “Danny” Wang of New Jersey pursuant to a five-count indictment.
The indictment describes a multi-year fraud scheme by Wang and his co-conspirators to obtain remote IT work with U.S. companies that generated more than $5 million in revenue.
The indictment also charges Chinese nationals Jing Bin Huang (靖斌 黄), Baoyu Zhou (周宝玉), Tong Yuze (佟雨泽), Yongzhe Xu (徐勇哲 andيونجزهي أكسو), Ziyou Yuan (زيو) and Zhenbang Zhou (周震邦), and Taiwanese nationals Mengting Liu (劉 孟婷) and Enchia Liu (刘恩) for their roles in the scheme.
According to the indictment, from approximately 2021 until October 2024, the defendants and other co-conspirators compromised the identities of more than 80 U.S. persons to obtain remote jobs at more than 100 U.S. companies, including many Fortune 500 companies, and caused U.S. victim companies to incur legal fees, computer network remediation costs, and other damages and losses of at least $3 million.
Overseas IT workers were assisted by Kejia Wang, Zhenxing Wang, and at least four other identified U.S. facilitators. Kejia Wang, for example, communicated with overseas co-conspirators and IT workers, and travelled to Shenyang and Dandong, China, including in 2023, to meet with them about the scheme.
To deceive U.S. companies into believing the IT workers were located in the United States, Kejia Wang, Zhenxing Wang, and the other U.S. facilitators received and/or hosted laptops belonging to U.S. companies at their residences, and enabled overseas IT workers to access the laptops remotely by, among other things, connecting the laptops to hardware devices designed to allow for remote access (referred to as keyboard-video-mouse or “KVM” switches).
Kejia Wang and Zhenxing Wang also created shell companies with corresponding websites and financial accounts, including Hopana Tech LLC, Tony WKJ LLC, and Independent Lab LLC, to make it appear as though the overseas IT workers were affiliated with legitimate U.S. businesses.
Kejia Wang and Zhenxing Wang established these and other financial accounts to receive money from victimized U.S. companies, much of which was subsequently transferred to overseas co‑conspirators. In exchange for their services, Kejia Wang, Zhenxing Wang, and the four other U.S. facilitators received a total of at least $696,000 from the IT workers.
IT workers employed under this scheme also gained access to sensitive employer data and source code, including International Traffic in Arms Regulations data from a California-based defense contractor that develops artificial intelligence-powered equipment and technologies.
Specifically, between on or about January 19, 2024, and on or about April 2, 2024, an overseas co-conspirator remotely accessed without authorisation the company’s laptop and computer files containing technical data and other information. The stolen data included information marked as being controlled under the ITAR.
Simultaneously with Monday’s announcement, the FBI and Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) seized 17 web domains used in furtherance of the charged scheme and further seized 29 financial accounts, holding tens of thousands of dollars in funds, used to launder revenue for the North Korean regime through the remote IT work scheme.
Previously, in October 2024, as part of this investigation, federal law enforcement executed searches at eight locations across three states that resulted in the recovery of more than 70 laptops and remote access devices, such as KVMs. Simultaneously with that action, the FBI seized four web domains associated with Kejia Wang’s and Zhenxing Wang’s shell companies used to facilitate North Korean IT work.
